We establish, for the first time, a connection between stochastic games and multiparameter eigenvalue problems, using the theory developed by Shapley and Snow (1950) in the context of matrix games. This connection provides new results, new proofs, and new tools for studying stochastic games.
Introduction
Two player stochastic games are repeated games in which a state variable follows a Markov chain controlled by the actions of both players, and where the players receive payoffs at every stage. The players maximize a discounted sum of these payoffs, where the discount factor stands for their impatience. The model was introduced in the 1950's by Shapley [9] in a finite framework, that is, the set of states K is finite, and to each state corresponds a matrix game. In this seminal paper, the author proved that the stochastic game with discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1] has a value for each initial state k, and that the vector of values v λ ∈ R K is the unique fixed point of a contracting operator Φ(λ, · ) : R K → R K , that is v λ = Φ(λ, v λ ). In the late 70's, the convergence of the values as λ vanishes was established by Bewley and Kohlberg [3] using the TarskiSeidenberg elimination theorem from mathematical logic and Puiseux theorem. Three alternative proofs have been provided since then, by Szczechla, Connell, Filar and Vrieze [11] , Oliu-Barton [7] and Attia and Oliu-Barton [2] . Besides the convergence, the latter provided a characterisation of the limit, and an alternative and uncoupled characterisation o the discounted values.
The problem of characterizing the limit, which has remained open since the pioneer work of Bewley and Kohlberg, was recently solved by Attia and Oliu-Barton [2] , whose approach also provides an alternative proof of the convergence.
But let us go back to matrix games. In the late 20's, Von Neumann proved the celebrated minmax theorem, stating the existence of the value and of a couple of optimal strategies for any matrix game G. The set of optimal strategies was characterized in the 50's by Shapley and Snow [10] as a polytope; each of its extreme points is given explicitly in terms of some square sub-matrixĠ of G, for which the following formula holds:
S(co(Ġ)) (1.1)
where for any matrix M , S(co(M ) denotes the sum of all the entries of the cofactor matrix of M , and S(co(Ġ)) = 0. The sub-matrixĠ will be referred here as a ShapleySnow kernel for G.
The theory developed by Shapley and Snow in the context of matrix games was used in the late 90's by Szczechla, Connell, Filar and Vrieze [11] to study stochastic games with the tools of complex analytic varieties. Their stating point was to express Shapley's fixed point equation as a system of n := |K| polynomial equalities, and can be described as follows. For each k ∈ K and z ∈ R K , the k-th coordinate of Shapley's operator Φ k (λ, z) is defined as the value of a matrix game G k whose entries are polynomial in the variables (λ, z 1 , . . . , z n ). Suppose thatĠ 1 , . . . ,Ġ n are ShapleySnow kernels of G 1 , . . . , G n respectively, for some λ. Then, the following polynomial system holds:
Each of these polynomial systems defines a complex analytical variety in C n+1 , and one can set W to be the union of all such varieties. By Shapley and Snow [10] , for each λ one has (λ, v 1 λ , . . . , v n λ ) ∈ W . The authors prove that λ → v λ is a regular connected component of dimension 1 of W , from which they deduce the convergence of the values v λ as λ vanishes. The expansion of the maps λ → v k λ as Puiseux series is also obtained, but not from Tarski-Seidenberg elimination theorem, but as a consequence of the geometry of varieties.
In the present paper, we propose a new approach for studying stochastic games based on the observation that the polynomial systems defined in [11] , which are a direct consequence of Shapley and Snow results, can be expressed as a multi-parameter eigenvalue problem, in the terminology of Atkinson [1] . That is, a system with n equalities of the form:
where M k 0 , . . . , M k n are n + 1 square matrices of equal size, for each k. One of the main tools for solving these systems is to use Kronecker products to transform (1.3) into an uncoupled system:
where ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n are n + 1 square auxiliary matrices. The transformation from a coupled system into an uncoupled one has already been used by the authors in [2] to provide a characterization of the limit values. Here, we use this approach to obtain new and simple proofs of important known results in the theory of stochastic games, such as the convergence of the discounted values v k λ as λ vanishes, and the expansion of the value function in Puiseux series near 0. Furthermore, we provide some new results such as a new upper bound for the speed of convergence, and for the algebraic order of the values (provided that the data is rational), and an explicit finite set V k containing the limit value. This set allows us to refine the algorithm provided by the authors in [2] in order to determine the limit value exactly. Section 2 is devoted to present the model and main results. In Section 3 we present our new approach, which establishes the connection between the theory of Shapley and Snow [10] for matrix games, and the theory of multi-parameter eigenvalue problems developed by Atkinson [1] . Section 4 is devoted to the application of the previously introduced tools to the study of discounted stochastic games, for a fixed discount factor. Finally, Section 5 derives from our approach some consequences on the asymptotic behavior of the discounted values.
Model and main results
The aim of this section is to present standard stochastic, introduced and studied by Shapley [9] , and our main results.
Standard stochastic games
Stochastic games are described by a 5-tuple Γ = (K, I, J, g, q), where K is the set of states, I and J are the action sets of Player 1 and 2 respectively, g : K × I × J → R is the payoff function and q : K × I × J → ∆(K) is the transition function, where for each finite set X, we denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions over X.
We assume throughout the paper that K, I and J are finite sets, and K = {1, . . . , n}.
The stochastic game Γ k λ
The stochastic game Γ proceeds by stages as follows: at every stage m ≥ 1, knowing the current state k m , the players choose simultaneously and independently actions i m and j m . The triplet (k m , i m , j m ) has two effects: it produces a stage payoff g m = g(k m , i m , j m ) and determines the law q( · |k m , i m , j m ) of the state at stage m + 1. For each λ ∈ (0, 1] we denote by Γ λ the λ-discounted game, that is, the game in which Player 1 maximizes the expectation of m≥1 λ(1 − λ) m−1 g m , whereas Player 2 minimizes the same amount. For each k ∈ K, we denote by Γ k λ the λ-discounted game with initial state k.
Past actions need not be perfectly observed by the players during the game. Rather, each player receives a signal at esch stage. Formally, there exist sets A and B and a mapping ϕ :
, player 1 is informed only of a m and player 2 only of b m . A strategy for player 1 is a function from the set of possible past histories ∪ m≥1 (K × A) m−1 × K to the set of mixed actions ∆(I), and similarly a strategy for player 2 is a function τ :
Strategies that depend, at each stage, only on the current state, are called stationary strategies. The set of stationary strategies for player 1 (resp. 2) is ∆(I) K (resp. ∆(J) K ).
As already observed by Shapley [9] , the assumption that the current state is observed implies the existence of optimal stationary strategies. For this reason, we will restrict our attention to stationary strategies throughout the paper. For any couple of stationary strategies (x, y) ∈ ∆(I) K ×∆(J) K and any initial state k, we denote by P k x,y the unique probability measure on the set of plays (K × I × J) N induced by a couple (x, y). Similarly, we denote by E k x,y the expectation with respect to P k x,y . Finally, we denote by γ k (x, y) the corresponding expected payoff, i.e.:
Before we present the results of Shapley [9] , let us introduce some useful notions.
Definition 2.1 For each k ∈ K, λ ∈ (0, 1] and u ∈ R K , the local game G k (λ, u) is the I × J-matrix game with payoff:
Definition 2.3 An optimal stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) in Γ λ is a stationary strategy x ∈ ∆(I) K (resp. y ∈ ∆(J) K ) that is optimal in Γ k λ , for all k ∈ K. For any fixed λ ∈ (0, 1], the main results in [9] can be stated as follows:
1. For each initial state k the stochastic game Γ k λ has a value, which satisfies:
In this respect, the restriction to stationary strategies is without loss.
2. The vector of values v λ ∈ R K is the unique fixed point of Φ(λ, · ) which is a strict contraction of R K with respect to the L ∞ -norm. That is, for all u 1 , u 2 ∈ R K :
3. Both players have optimal stationary strategies.
Main results
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
(1) We establish, for the first time, a connection between stochastic games and multiparameter eigenvalue problems, using Shapley and Snow theory. This connection provides new tools for studying stochastic games, and the following results.
The rest of our statements hold for each state k = 1, . . . , n.
(2) Using our approach, we construct a finite set of non-zero bi-variate polynomials E k with the following property: there exists λ 0 > 0 and P ∈ E k such that:
, we construct a finite set V k ⊂ R containing any accumulation point of the discounted values (v k λ ) λ . From the finiteness of V k we derive an alternative proof of the convergence of the values, as λ vanishes.
(4) From (2) we obtain the expression of λ → v k λ as a Puiseux series using Puiseux's theorem. Though not new, our result shows a direct way to obtain this property without invoking neither Tarski-Seidenberg elimination principle (as in [3] ) nor the geometry of complex analytic varieties (as in [11] ).
(5) We then deduce a new upper bound for the speed of convergence of the values to the limit, and for the algebraic order of v k λ and lim λ→0 v k λ (provided that the data matrix D(λ) takes rational values), namely min(|I|, |J|) n . This bound beats the best known upper bound of (2 min(|I|, |J|) + 5) n obtained by Hansen et al. [4] . Our bound is tight in the class of absorbing games. In general, there exists stochastic games where the lower bound min(|I|, |J|) n−1 holds, according to [4] .
(6) We use (3) to refine the algorithm provided by the authors in [2] to compute the limit value exactly.
A new approach

Shapley-Snow kernels for matrix games
Throughout this section, G will denote a fixed I ×J-matrix game with value v = val(G). The set of optimal strategies for player 1 and 2 will be denoted by X * ⊂ ∆(I) and Y * ⊂ ∆(J), respectively. These sets are compact, non-empty polytopes, so that they can be entirely described by their (finitely many) extreme points. A characterization of the extreme points of X * × Y * , called basic solutions of G, was provided Shapley and Snow's [10] . Before we state their result, we will introduce some notation.
Notation throughout the paper
• For any finite set Z, we denote its cardinal by |Z|.
• We denote by 1 and U , respectively, a column vector and a matrix of 1's. The size shall be clear in every context.
• For any square matrix M = (M i,j ) i,j , we denote by co(M ) its cofactor matrix, and by S(M ) the sum of the entries of M .
• Mixed strategies will be considered as column vectors, so that the expected payoff induced by a couple of mixed strategies (x, y) ∈ ∆(I) × ∆(J) is t xGy.
• We denote byĠ a sub-matrix of G. For any sub-matrixĠ of G, we denote byẋ the restriction of x to the row indices ofĠ. Similarly,ẏ ∈ R J is the restriction of y to the column indices ofĠ.
Characterization of basic solutions
We are now ready to state the main result in Shapley and Snow [10] , and to introduce Shapley-Snow kernels. The following theorem is a convenient restatement of their results.
Theorem 3.1 (Shapley and Snow 1950) Let G be a I × J matrix game with optimal strategies X * and Y * . Then (x, y) ∈ X * × Y * is a basic solution of G if and only if there exists a square sub-gameĠ satisfying (1) and (2):
Moreover, in this case one also has:
Definition 3.2 A Shapley-Snow kernel of G associated to a basic solution (x, y) is a square sub-matrixĠ satisfying the four conditions of Theorem 3.1.
Other properties
The purpose of the remaining of this section is to derive some consequences from Theorem 3.1. The properties obtained here will be useful in establishing a connection between the theory of basic solutions of matrix games, and that of multi-parameter eigenvalue problems in linear algebra.
Let us start by three Lemmas.
Lemma 3.3 For any square matrix M one has:
Subtracting one row to all other rows of M + zU , it is clear that its degree is at most 1. From the formulae tr(
which hold for any square matrix M , one deduces
for any square matrix M and any z ∈ R.
(ii) Applying (i) to M + zU and −z yields:
Comparing with (i), one obtains S(co(M )) = S(co(M + zU )) for any M and z. (iii) By the symmetric role of both players, it is enough to prove the first statement. Let m ∈ N * be the size of M , and let M 1 , . . . , M m be its rows. Then, for each ℓ = 1, . . . , m the ℓ-th component of the vector co(M )1 satisfies:
thanks to the properties of the determinant (that is, we added z times the ℓ-th column to the other columns).
The next result is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.4 LetĠ be a Shapley-Snow kernel for G. ThenĠ + zU is a Shapley-Snow kernel of the translated game G + zU , for any z ∈ R.
Proof. To prove thatĠ+zU is a Shapley-Snow kernel, it is enough to check properties (1) and (2) of Theorem 3.1. Yet, on the one hand, S(co(Ġ + zU )) = S(co(Ġ)) = 0 by Lemma 3.3 (ii). On the other, by Lemma 3.3 (iii), the following strategies do not depend on z:ẋ
which completes the proof.
Let us now state a result from linear algebra, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.5 Let M be a square matrix of size a ∈ N * and rank a − 1, and let x and y be such that Ker( t M ) =< x > and Ker(M ) =< y >. Then there exists a constant α = 0 such that co(M ) = α t xy.
The next result, which relies on Theorem 3.1 and Lemmas presented so far, gathers all the properties that will be used in the sequel. Proposition 3.6 Let G be an I × J-matrix game with value v := val(G), and letĠ be a Shapley-Snow kernel for G defining strategies (ẋ,ẏ). Then:
tẋẏ . In particular, co(Ġ − vU ) is non-zero, and has all its non-zero entries of same sign.
Proof.
(i) By Lemma 3.4,Ġ − vU is a Shapley-Snow kernel for G − vU so that, in particular, S(co(Ġ − vU )) = 0.
(ii) For any matrix M and z ∈ R, clearly val(M + zU ) = val(M ) + z. Hence, the formulae of Theorem 3.1 (3) yield:
(iii) By the symmetric role of both players, it is enough to prove the first statement. The matrixĠ − vU is not invertible and its matrix of cofactors co(Ġ − vU ) is non-zero, thanks to (i). Hence, if 1 ≤ b ≤ min(|I|, |J|) denotes its size, one has rank(Ġ − vU ) = b−1 or, equivalently dim(Ker(Ġ−vU )) = 1. Yet by Theorem 3.1 (4), one hasĠẏ = v1
(iv) It follows from Lemma 3.5, as the hypotheses are satisfied thanks to (ii) and (iii).
Multi-parameter eigenvalue problems
Throughout this section, we consider an array n × (n + 1) square matrices:
such that for each k, all matrices of the k-th row are of equal size. We briefly present the so-called multi-parameter eigenvalue problem, terminology introduced by Atkinson [1] . That is, the problem of finding some vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z n ) ∈ R n satisfying 1 :
In order to study such systems, one introduces the following n + 1 auxiliary matrices using the Kronecker product (or tensor product) of matrices.
Preliminaries on Kronecker products
Let us start by recalling the definition of the Kronecker product ⊗ of two matrices and the corresponding determinant det ⊗ .
Definition 3.7
• The Kronecker product of an m × n matrix A and a p × q matrix B is a mp × nq matrix defined by blocks as follows:
• Suppose that A 11 , . . . , A nn are n 2 matrices such that for each row k, A k1 , . . . , A kn are of same size. The Kronecker determinant is defined by:
where S(n) denotes the set of permutations of the set {1, . . . , n} and ε(σ) stands for the signature of σ.
We can now define the matrices ∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n , which are all square of same size, namely n k=1 a k , where a k ∈ N * denotes the common size of the matrices M k 0 , . . . , M k n , for each k.
Definition 3.8 For each k = 0, . . . , n let D k denote the n × n block matrix obtained by deleting the k-th column (of blocks) of the matrix D defined in (3.1). Then:
The following canonical bijection between a product of finite sets, and a set of same cardinal will be useful. 1 In the original work of Atkinson, the author considers the homogeneous case
Definition 3.9 Let S 1 , . . . , S n be n finite sets and set t k := n ℓ=k+1 |S ℓ | for all k = 0, . . . , n. The canonical bijection between S 1 × · · · × S n and {1, . . . , t 0 } is given by:
Let us now state some useful properties of Kronecker products:
(K1) The product ⊗ is bilinear and associative, but not commutative.
(K2) The determinant det ⊗ has the same properties as the usual determinant, i.e. it is multilinear and alternating, but only with respect to the columns 2 .
(K3) Let A 1 , . . . , A n and B 1 , . . . , B n some matrices such that the products
(K4) Let A 1 , . . . , A n some matrices over the sets I 1 ×J 1 , . . . , I n ×J n , respectively. Let r and (i 1 , . . . , i n ), and s and (j 1 , . . . , j n ) be related by the corresponding canonical bijections. Then:
. . , A nn be an n×n array of matrices such that A k1 , . . . , A kn are matrices over the same set I k × J k , for all k = 1, . . . , n. Let r and (i 1 , . . . , i n ), and s and (j 1 , . . . , j n ) be related by the corresponding canonical bijections. Then the (r, s)-th entry of the matrix det ⊗ (A 11 , . . . , A nn ) is:
The uncoupled system
Consider now the following uncoupled system:
Notation. In the sequel, we will use the following notation: S M denotes the set of solutions to (3.2), and S ∆ denotes the set of solutions to (3.3).
The importance of the auxiliary matrices ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n becomes clear with the following result, which can be found in Atkinson [1, Chapter 6] . 2 Because of the non-commutativity of the direct product, rows and columns do not play the same role. The determinant needs to be developed by columns.
Proof. Fix k, and let
, for all ℓ = 1, . . . , n, which exist because the matrices are singular. Then (y 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ y n ) = 0 and:
where the first equality follows from (K3), the second is a consequence of the equalities M r 0 y r = − n ℓ=1 z ℓ M r ℓ y r for r = 1, . . . , n and (K2), the third follows from the fact that, for all ℓ = k, the (block) matrix has two equal columns (of blocks) so that its determinant vanishes, and finally the last equality is obtained by taking a cyclic permutation of the columns (of blocks) which has signature (−1) k+1 . Hence
As this is true for all k, it follows that (z 1 , . . . , z n ) satisfies the system (3.3).
In the proof of Proposition 3.10 we have, in fact, proved the following slightly stronger result.
Corollary 3.11 Let z ∈ S M and let y
Let us end this section with a result that will be useful in the sequel, inspired in a similar lemma from Muhic and Plestenjak [6] . Proof. Let r := rank(A + z 0 B) and suppose that r = max z∈R rank(A + zB). As the rank of a matrix is the maximal size of its invertible square sub-matrices, A + z 0 B admits some invertible r × r sub-matrix. By continuity, there exists ε > 0 such that this sub-matrix is invertible in the interval (z 0 − ε, z 0 + ε), so that rank(A + zB) ≥ r in this interval. As we have supposed that r is the maximal rank, the converse inequality also holds, so that rank(A + zB) = r on (z 0 − ε, z 0 + ε). Using Cramer's rule, one deduces the existence of r(m − r) + 1 polynomials P 1 r+1 , . . . , P 1 m , . . . , P r r+1 , . . . , P r m and P such that, up to a permutation of the rows, the kernel of A + zB is given by the following set of vectors:
. . .
where t r+1 , . . . , t m are the free variables 3 . Multiplying by P (z), one deduces the existence of a vector y(z) ∈ R m with polynomial entries satisfying (A + λB)y(z) = 0 on (z 0 − ε, z 0 + ε) and y(z 0 ) = y 0 . Differentiating the first equality, one obtains
Multiplication by t x 0 at z 0 yields then: 
Application to discounted stochastic games
In this section we are going to apply Shapley and Snow's theory and tools from multiparameter eigenvalue problems to derive the following result for discounted stochastic games: for each initial state k ∈ K and each discount factor λ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a bivariate polynomial P k such that P k (λ, v k λ ) = 0. As we will see in Section 5, this result has important implications on the asymptotic behavior of the value function.
Some preliminaries
Let (K, I, J, g, q) be a stochastic games with state space K =: {1, . . . , n}. First of all, consider the following array of n × (n + 1) matrices constructed directly from the data of the game:
where for each k, ℓ ∈ K we denote by Q k,ℓ and G k the matrices of size |I| × |J|:
and where U stands for a matrix of 1's of size |I| × |J|. The theory of multi-parameter eigenvalue problems can be applied since the matrices are of equal size over each row, as in (3.1). It will be convenient to rename these matrices as follows:
Define the matrices ∆ 0 , . . . , ∆ n accordingly, as in Definition 3.8.
Remark 4.1
We have omitted the dependence on λ of the entries of M k ℓ and of ∆ k to simplify the notation. Note, however, that the former depend at most linearly on λ, while the latter depend polynomially on λ with degree at most n.
The following result, borrowed from Attia and Oliu Barton [2, Lemma 3.3] , is a consequence of the fact that M k k + ℓ =k M k ℓ ≥ λU for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 4.2 One has
The following definition will be useful in the sequel.
Definition 4.3
For each k, let E k be the set of the non-zero bi-variate polynomialṡ
obtained by ranging over all the square sub-matrices∆ k − z∆ 0 of ∆ k − z∆ 0 .
Obviously, the sets E k are finite, as a matrix has finitely many sub-matrices.
A polynomial equality: first approach
By Shapley and Snow, each local normalized game:
admits a Shapley-Snow kernel, which is some square sub-matrix, obtained as the sum of the corresponding square sub-matrices of M k ℓ , that we denote byṀ k ℓ . Again, the matricesṀ 1 0 , . . . ,Ṁ n n define an array of n(n + 1) matrices with equal sizes over each row, as in (3.1), so that one can define∆ 0 ,∆ 1 , . . . ,∆ n accordingly (see Definition 3.8).
Remark 4.4 It is worth mentioning that∆ k −z k∆0 is not necessarily a Shapley-Snow kernel of the matrix ∆ k − z k ∆ 0 . Nevertheless, a sufficient condition for this to happen is that S(co(∆ k − z k∆0 )) = 0.
Consider the corresponding determinantal systems:
Denote their sets of solutions, respectively, as SṀ and S∆. Consider also the set of solutions S G and SĠ to the following value systems, inspired from Shapley [9] and Shapley and Snow [10] , respectively:
The relations between these 4 systems is summarized in the next statement.
Proposition 4.5
The following relations hold:
Proof. By Shapley [9] , S G = {v λ }. Applying Proposition 3.6 (ii) to the local games (G ℓ (λ, v λ )) ℓ one obtains, for each k:
so that {v λ } = S G = SĠ ⊂ SṀ . The last inclusion follows from Proposition 3.10.
Remark 4.6 At this point, it is unclear whether the sets SṀ and S∆ contain one or more elements. Examples where the former can contains min(|I|, |J|) elements, and where the latter is infinite are described in the Appendix.
Let us now show an algebraic property of the discounted values.
Proposition 4.7 For each k = 1, . . . , n one has:
Proof. Letẋ k andẏ k be some Shapley-Snow strategies for the local game G k (λ, v λ ), for all k. By Proposition 3.6 (iii), one haṡ
Hence, by Corollary 3.11, one has
. By the symmetric roles of the players, one hasẋ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ẋ n ∈ Ker( 
All the hypotheses of Lemma 3.12 are fulfilled with A =∆ k and B = −∆ 0 , which gives the desired result.
We can now state the main result of this section.
Corollary 4.8 For each k ∈ K and λ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a polynomial
Proof. Let k and λ be fixed, and let z be a real variable. Let r denote the rank oḟ ∆ k − z∆ 0 , that is, the size of the biggest square sub-matrix such that its determinant, which is a polynomial in z and λ (see Remark 4.1), is not identically equal to 0. Let P k = 0 denote this bi-variate polynomial. The rank drop condition of Proposition 4.7 yields P k (λ, v k λ ) = 0. It remains to show that P k ∈ E k , which follows from the canonical bijection between I n and {1, . . . , |I| n } given in Definition 3.9. Indeed, any sub-matrix of∆ k − z∆ 0 , which corresponds to the choice of sub-matricesṀ 1 0 , . . . ,Ṁ n n of equal size over each row, is a sub-matrix of ∆ k − z∆ 0 .
The following result is immediate, since the degree of polynomial in Corollary 4.8 in the second variables is bounded by min(|I|, |J|) n , the size of the biggest square sub-matrix of W k (λ, z).
Corollary 4.9 Suppose that the data matrix D(λ) has rational entries. Then v k λ is an algebraic number of order at most min(|I|, |J|) n .
As already stated in Section 2.2, our bound improves all previously known bounds and almost fits the best known lower bound min(|I|, |J|) n−1 .
A polynomial equality: second approach
The approach presented is last section establishes, for the first time, a connection between stochastic games and multi-parameter eigenvalue problems, using Shapley and Snow theory. As we will show below, one can derive from Corollary 4.8 several properties concerning the asymptotic behavior of the values. Before we proceed, we present an alternative proof of this result, based on [2, Theorem 1], presented here: 
The proof that we are going to present has the advantage of being more direct and easier to handle, but hides the connections with the multi-parameter eigenvalue theory.
An alternative proof of Corollary 4.8
, and let:
Clearly,Ṗ k belongs to the set E k , introduced in Definition 4.3. By Proposition 3.6 (ii) and Theorem 4.10 one has:
To conclude, it is enough to prove thatṖ = 0. An easy way is to compute its partial derivative. Recall that for any square matrix M , one has det(M + H) = det(M ) + tr(
As already argued in (4.6) one has val(
Hence, by Proposition 3.6 (iv), the matrix co(∆ k − v k λ∆ 0 ) is not identically zero and has all its entries of same sign. By Lemma 4.2, all entries of∆ 0 are larger than λ n . Thus,
which proves the result.
Remark 4.11
The two proofs of Corollary 4.8 provide two polynomials P 1 and P 2 in the set E k such that
The first one is constructed via the rank drop condition given by the choice of a Shapley-Snow kernel at every local game G k (λ, v λ ), the second is obtained by considering directly a Shapley-Snow kernel of the matrix ∆ k − v k λ ∆ 0 . As already noticed earlier (see Remark 4.4) these two notions may not coincide, so that P 1 and P 2 may differ.
Asymptotic behaviour of the values
In this section we prove some useful consequences of Corollary 4.8 on the asymptotic behaviour of the discounted values (v k λ ) λ . In order to state our results with the best possible bounds, we will no longer assume that the action sets are state-independent.
Rather, let I k × J k denote the action set at state k, for all k ∈ K, and let the payoff and transition functions be defined over the set
The results in Section 4 can be easily extended to this case, since the data matrix D(λ) still satisfies the conditions of Section 3.2, that is, the blocks are of constant size on every row. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we will assume that |I k | = |J k | = 1 for any absorbing state k, i.e. Q k,k = U .
Set a := n k=1 min(|I k |, |J k |). For each initial state k = 1, . . . , n one has: (1) There exists a finite set V k containing all accumulation points of (v k λ ) λ . The following remark will be useful.
Remark 5.1 All polynomials in E k are defined as the determinant of some square sub-matrix of size less or equal than a, with all its entries depending at most linearly on z. Hence, the degree in z of all such polynomials is uniformly bounded by a.
Convergence of the values
Let us start by defining the set V k and establishing (1) . Note that (1) clearly implies (3), and also (2) thanks to the continuity of the value function.
An initial state k will be a fixed throughout this section. Let us start by introducing some useful notions. Let ϕ be the following map from the set of polynomials in (λ, z) to the set of polynomials in z:
where m := deg 1 (P ) denotes the degree of P in the variable λ and P 0 , . . . , P m are the unique polynomials in z such that P (λ, z) = m r=0 P r (z)λ s . Now let E k be the image of E k by ϕ, that is:
Finally, let V k ⊂ R be the following limit set:
where C − := min k,i,j g(k, i, j) and C + = max k,i,j g(k, i, j).
Proof. Let (λ n ) n be such that lim n→∞ λ n = 0 and lim n→∞ v k λn = w. By Corollary 4.8, for each n there exists a polynomial P n ∈ E k such that P n (λ n , v k λn ) = 0. The set E k being finite, up to extracting a subsequence we can assume that P n is constant, say equal to P . Hence, for each n ∈ N * one has:
Then, by the definition of the map ϕ, one has:
Diving by λ s n and taking n to infinity, it follows that ϕ P (w) = 0. Hence, w ∈ V k .
Corollary 5.3
The values (v k λ ) λ converge, and the limit belongs to V k .
Proof. The set of accumulation points of (v k λ ) λ is non-empty, by boundedness, and is included in V k by Proposition 5. Proof. Let z ∈ V k . By definition of V k , there exists P ∈ E k such that ϕ P (z) = 0. By definition of ϕ P its degree is bounded by the degree in z of P . The result follows, as w k ∈ V k by Corollary 5.3.
Speed of convergence and Puiseux expansion
To prove (4) and (5), let us start by recalling the definition of a Puiseux series.
Definition 5.5 A map f : (0, ε) → C is a Puiseux series if there exists N ∈ N * , m 0 ∈ Z and a complex sequence (a m ) m≥m 0 such that:
Any bounded Puiseux series satisfies m 0 ≥ 0 and, in particular, converges as λ → 0. The following result is based on Puiseux's Theorem [8] .
Theorem 5.6 (Puiseux, 1850) Let P (λ, z) be a bi-variate polynomial. There exists λ 0 > 0 such that the roots of P (λ, · ) are Puiseux series in the interval (0, λ 0 ).
Proposition 5.7
The following assertions hold:
(i) There exists λ 0 > 0 and P ∈ E k such that P (λ, v k λ ) = 0 for all λ ∈ (0, λ 0 ) (ii) There exists λ 0 > 0 such that λ → v k λ is a Puiseux series on (0, λ 0 )
(ii) As λ vanishes one has the following bound:
Proof.
(i) and (ii). By construction, any polynomial P ∈ E k is of degree at most n in λ. By Puiseux's theorem, for each of these polynomials, there exists λ 1 > 0 such that the m ≤ n roots z 1 (λ), . . . , z m (λ) of P (λ, · ) are Puiseux series on (0, λ 1 ). By finiteness of the set E k , we can suppose that λ 1 is common to all polynomials. Ranging over the different polynomials of E k , we thus define a finite set of Puiseux series. By Corollary 4.8, λ → v k λ belongs to this set. The continuity of the map λ → v k λ implies that, as λ changes, v k λ may change of branch (i.e. of Puiseux series) only at points where two such series intersect. Yet, two different Puiseux series cannot intersect infinitely many times on (0, λ 1 ). Consequently, there exists 0 < λ 0 < λ 1 such that, on (0, λ 0 ), any two Puiseux series are either congruent or disjoint. It follows that v k λ = z(λ) on (0, λ 0 ) for one of these series.
. By the definition of ϕ, one can write:
for some integers s ≤ n and t ≥ s + 1.From these two relations, one deduces that:
In particular, one has ϕ P (w k ) = 0. More precisely, as ϕ P = 0 by definition there exists a integer r ≤ n and a polynomial Q such that
It follows that |v k λ − w k | r = O(λ t−s ). Now, recall from Remark 5.1 that the degree of P (λ, z) is bounded by a, so that the same bound holds for the degree of ϕ P . Hence, r ≤ M . On the other hand, t = s + 1 in the worst case, which gives the result.
Tightness of the bound
In the class of absorbing games (that is, stochastic games in which all states except one, say state 1, are absorbing), the bound given in Proposition 5.7 reduces to
where a := min(|I 1 |, |J 1 |). The following example, due to Kohlberg [5] shows that the bound is tight in this class of games. 
Determining the exact limit values
For any k ∈ K, the limit set V k defined in section 5.1 can be computed algorithmically without using any game theoretical skills. It is finite and included in the interval [C − , C + ] by definition and, more importantly, contains the limit value w k thanks to Corollary 5.3. This sets allow us to transform the algorithm provided by the authors in [2] , intended to compute an approximation w k , into a exact calculation. Let us start by recalling the characterisation provided therein.
Theorem 5.8 (Attia and Oliu-Barton 2018) For each k, the values (v k λ ) λ converge to the unique point w k ∈ R satisfying:
where for each z ∈ R, F k (z) := lim λ→0 λ −n val(∆ k − z∆ 0 ).
The algorithm provided in [2] goes as follows. Set an error ε > 0, and initialize w = C − and w = C + , then let d := w − w. Then, for each k, proceed as follows.
While w < w and d2 −m > ε, update these variables according to:
The algorithm terminates after at most ⌈ ln(d/ε) ln 2 ⌉ iterations, and the same number of computations of the sign of F k , and provides a final interval of size at most ε, denoted by [w f , w f ] containing w k . Combining it with Corollary 5.3, one obtains a finite set containing the exact value of the limit, whose diameter is less than ε:
In particular, setting ε := min{ 1 2 |v − v ′ |, v, v ′ ∈ V k , v = v ′ } at the beginning of the algorithm leads to the exact limit value, since [w f , w f ] contains a unique element of V k , which is the limit value.
Let M be a square matrix of size a ∈ N * and rank a − 1, and let x and y be such that Ker( t M ) =< x > and Ker(M ) =< y >. Then there exists a constant α = 0 such that co(M ) = α t xy.
Proof. Using the relation t A co(A) = det(A) Id, which is valid for any matrix A and det(M ) = 0, we get t M co(M ) = 0. Moreover since Ker(M ) =< y >, all the rows of co(M ) are proportional to y. Hence, there exists x ′ such that co(M ) = t x ′ y. But this equality shows that the columns of co(M ) are proportional to x ′ . A symmetric argument shows that the column are proportional to x so that x and x ′ are proportional. Let α ∈ R be such that x ′ = αx so that co(M ) = α t xy. As M is of rank n − 1, the matrix co(M ) has a non-zero column, so that α = 0, which proves the result. where c * indicates that an absorbing state is reached with probability 1, where the payoff is equal to c regardless of players' action. Model this game over the set of states {1, 2, 3}, where state 1 is non absorbing, and states 2 and 3 are absorbing with payoffs a and b, respectively (w.l.o.g. we assume that players have only one action in these states). For any z ∈ R 3 the normalized local games G k (λ, z) − z k U are given by:
aλ + (1 − λ)z 2 − z 1 −λz 1 −λz 1 bλ + (1 − λ)z 3 − z 1 , λ(a − z 2 ) , and
The unique Shapley-Snow kernel of G 1 (λ, v λ ) is the entire matrix, so that the system (4.3) reduces to the equalities z 2 = a, z 3 = b and:
Yet, this system has 2 solutions for any a > b > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1].
Example 2: S ∆ is infinite
Consider a two-state two-actions stochastic game where the states do not communicate. Formally, K = {1, 2}, |I| = |J| = 2 and q(k | k, i, j) = 1, for k = 1, 2 and (i, j) ∈ I × J. Suppose also that g(1, i, j) = 1 and g(2, i, j) = 1 {i=j} for all (i, j) ∈ I × J, so that the array of matrices is given by:
The normalized local games G k (λ, z) − z k U are given by:
λ(1 − z 1 )U and λ 1 − z 2 −z 2 −z 2 1 − z 2 so that any entry of the first local game is a Shapley-Snow kernel, and the entire game is the unique Shapley-Snow kernel of the second. Thus, the correspondingṀ -system (4.3) has a unique solution SṀ = {(1 ,   1 2 )}. On the other hand, the auxiliary matrices arė ∆ 0 =∆ 1 = λ 2 U and∆ 2 = λ 2 Id, all of size 2 × 2, and S∆ = {(z 1 , z 2 ) | z 1 ∈ R, z 2 = 1 2 }.
